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The Time of Our Lives
Daniel S. Hamermesh
University of Texas at Austin
Time is the ultimate scarce resource, yet we do not pay enough 
attention to its scarcity. This chapter presents information on alloca-
tions of this limited resource in the United States and elsewhere. More 
important, however, I wish to illustrate how economics can provide in-
sights into the role of time in our lives. A recent pair of advertisements 
for Mont Blanc pens shows Johnny Depp (or Julianne Moore) holding 
a pen and saying, “Time is precious, use it wisely.” That expresses the 
essence of my argument: Time is scarce, and because economics is to 
a large extent the study of scarcity, we as economists have something 
unique to offer to the analysis of how people spend their time.
The empirical motivation for much of the discussion is the Ameri-
can Time Use Survey (ATUS). Using those and other data, I demon-
strate that in a variety of ways the United States is really a strange 
country in terms of time. I show in a variety of contexts how men and 
women differ in their relation to time. I examine when people do things 
and how that has changed over time, and I discuss an increasingly im-
portant policy issue: the relation among time use, retirement, and skill 
shortages.
The central idea motivating much of this discussion comes from 
Becker (1965): Time is scarce, in that we all only have 24 hours a day—
whether a rich or poor person, or a rich or poor country. Both a rich per-
son and an average person in a rich country have many more dollars to 
spend per unit of time than does a poor person in a poor country. Now, 
time by itself is of no use whatsoever. One may lie on the bed and oc-
casionally just look at the ceiling, doing nothing, but mostly we use the 
things that we buy in conjunction with the time that we have available. 
We take a vacation and we spend money on hotels and airfare and tour-
ing and so on. We have to choose not just how to spend time but how to 
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combine time and goods together. Given that time and goods are used 
together, it is clear that for higher-income people and in richer coun-
tries, time is relatively more scarce than goods. Time scarcity is not a 
problem if you have little money to spend with the time you have. 
One might argue that although there are only 24 hours in a day, 
people are living longer and thus have more total time available over 
their lives. As the second column of Table 1.1 shows, that is correct: 
Over the past half century, the average American’s longevity has risen 
suffi ciently to provide 10 percent more years to him/her. Also, these 
are healthier years and, as Murphy and Topel (2006) show, the health 
improvements compound the improvements in well-being. The 10 per-
cent extra years of life pale, however, compared to the increase in real 
incomes, which have tripled on average over the past half century. We 
have gotten much richer, yet we have not obtained much more time in 
which to spend our vastly increased incomes.
The same issue pertains to an individual as his earnings increase 
and time becomes more valuable over the life cycle. This became very 
apparent to me when I started doing economics in the mid-1960s. Two 
years after we got married, my wife and I took a two-week vacation 
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camping in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Canada. We drove our 
beat-up car, stayed in campgrounds, and did our own cooking. In 1989, 
when my wife was practicing law and I was very busy, we took a one-
week vacation to France, staying at good hotels, eating at one-star res-
taurants and, of course, fl ying across the Atlantic. 
HOW WE (AND OTHERS) USE TIME
What people actually do with their time in this country can be seen 
using the ATUS. Because the basic data are coded into 406 categories, 
I, like anyone else using them, must decide about appropriate aggrega-
tion. I have combined the activities into four particular types. Table 1.2 
shows that on a typical day in 2003, men are working for pay for about 
313 minutes and women are working for pay for 201 minutes. The next 
category, household production, consists of things like shopping, cook-
ing, cleaning, washing the dishes, and child care, i.e., all the things 
that you might pay somebody to do for you. You could have a cook, a 
shopper, a cleaner, and a babysitter. We call these activities home work, 
unpaid work, and other things. As the table shows, women are doing 
much more of these than men, which is no surprise. Tertiary activities 
are anything that you must do some of—sleep, wash, eat, and others; 
Table 1.2  Average Time Allocations, by Category, United States, 2003, 
All Respondents Ages 20–74 (minutes per representative day)
Men Women
Market work 313 201
Household production 163 271
Family care 28 60
Shopping 43 59
All work 476 472




SOURCE: Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2008).
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sleep accounts for the bulk of such time. Lastly, leisure includes things 
that you do not have to do but that you do for fun. There are slight dif-
ferences by gender, with women spending more time sleeping, washing 
up, cleaning up, etc., and men spending more time in leisure. Men work 
more in the market, women work more at home, but the sums of market 
and home work, and thus the sums of tertiary activities and leisure, are 
almost identical across genders.
Although the data are not strictly comparable, it is worth examining 
how time spent in the critical activities, shopping and child care, has 
changed in the United States by gender. As Table 1.3 shows, and as we 
already saw for 2003, it is no surprise to fi nd that women are spending 
more time in these activities than men. The most recent year’s data for 
child care may be problematic, but certainly between the 1960s and 
1990s women were spending less and less time taking care of kids. 
Partly this is because more women are working for pay, but also (and 
related to rising female wage rates and labor force participation) there 
were fewer kids. The average household was producing 3.5 kids in the 
1950s, today that number is down to 2. It is worth noting, however, that 
men and women are sharing more of the shopping and child care, wheth-
er as cause or effect of women’s increased labor force participation. 
Let us compare the United States to other countries. Burda, 
Hamermesh, and Weil (2008) make similar calculations to those in Ta-
ble 1.2 for Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, which are presented 
in Table 1.4. The thing to note is that we work more for pay than the 
average adult in these European countries. I could have included many 
Table 1.3  Minutes per Day in Shopping and Child Care, by Gender, All 
Respondents Ages 19–64, 1965–2003
1965 1975 1985 1992–94 2003
Shopping
Men 36 44 46 36 40
Women 61 64 57 56 59
Child care
Men 14 13 14 8 12a
Women 54 37 27 20 32a
aProbably defi ned more broadly than in earlier surveys.
SOURCE: Harvey (2006).
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other European countries—even Japan—and we would still fi nd that 
the average person does not work as much in the market as the average 
American does. Since these calculations fail to account for vacation 
time, and since our vacations are shorter than those in other economies 
(Altonji and Oldham 2003), they understate the excess of paid work 
here compared to other rich countries.
Comparing across gender in Tables 1.2 and 1.4, consider the total 
of unpaid work in the household and work for pay. In the three Anglo-
Saxon countries, total work time is almost identical by gender—the dif-
ferences are 2 percent or less. Only in the Mediterranean country do we 
fi nd the popular expectation—that women do more work in total than 
men (and implicitly have less free time)—to be true (even though the 
fertility rate in Italy is among the lowest in Europe). Whether this equal-
ity is a general phenomenon and what causes it are things that I am now 
actively engaged in studying.
Table 1.4  Average Time Allocations (minutes), Women and Men, All







Female Male Female Male Female Male
Market work 133 263 133 290 124 254
Household 
production
312 174 347 115 268 145
Family care 42 18 39 19 51 17
Shopping 66 49 53 33 53 36
All work 445 437 480 405 392 399
Tertiary time 675 654 593 595 659 634
Sleep 509 499 499 497 524 504
Leisure 320 349 367 440 389 407
Radio/TV 100 135 89 114 99 119
SOURCE: Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2008).
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INCENTIVES FOR COMBINING TIME AND GOODS
The relationship between goods inputs and time inputs into an 
activity is unclear. Averaging across all activities, there can be no re-
lationship, as each person spends the same total amount of time—24 
hours—on the activities he or she engages in. So the answer depends on 
whether, relative to the average activity, goods and time are more or less 
readily substitutable in the particular activity in question. If they are 
not, we will observe a positive relationship between goods purchased 
and time spent. Figure 1.1 examines this issue for food spending and 
time inputs into food (shopping, cooking, eating, and cleaning up). The 
Figure 1.1  Relation between the Natural Logarithm of Annual Food
Expenditure and Time Spent Shopping for and Preparing 
Food, Eating and Cleaning Up, U.S. 2003–2004 (horizontal 
 axis is minutes per day, vertical axis is $ per year)
NOTE: 90% CI is the 90% confi dence interval around the predicted values of 
the logarithms of food spending at the logarithms of time spent on eating, food 
preparation, clean-up, etc.
SOURCE: Hamermesh (2007).
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data are for ATUS respondents in 2003 and 2004 matched to the Food 
Security Supplements in the December 2002 and 2003 Current Popula-
tion Surveys (CPS). The fi gure shows that households that spend more 
on food also devote more time to all the aspects of eating. (This holds 
even if we adjust for family composition.) This suggests that it is fairly 
diffi cult to substitute goods for time in the particular activity of eating.
As Tables 1.2 and 1.4 show, by far the biggest single activity in which 
people engage is sleep. Is sleep an economic activity—does it respond 
to economic incentives—or is it purely biologically determined? Taking 
earlier research (Biddle and Hamermesh 1990), one can use results from 
the 1975–1976 Time Use Study to calculate for men and women the ce-
teris paribus effect of higher wages. Dividing human activity into only 
three categories—sleep, market work, and everything else—the fi rst row 
of Table 1.5 shows time allocations for men and for women whose time 
price is half the average for their gender. The middle row shows these 
at the average wage, and the bottom row presents time allocations for 
people earning twice the average wage. People with higher wages (or 
potential earnings) sleep less. I would argue that this occurs because the 
alternative to sleep—working for pay—is relatively more advantageous 
for them. Indeed, when the unpublished version of this paper circulated, 
the New York Times ran a story about it with the headline, “Sleep? Why? 
There’s No Money in It” (Passell 1989). People have things other than 
sleep that they can do with their time, and one of those, market work, 
becomes more attractive when the returns to it rise. 
The effects of higher wage rates on time spent sleeping are not so 
large for women as for men, suggesting that, perhaps for biological rea-
Table 1.5  Effects of Wages on Time Spent Sleeping and in Other Unpaid 
Activities, United States, 1975–1976 (minutes per representa-







Half the average 495 595 350 494 710 236
Average 487 605 348 497 698 245
Twice the average 469 628 343 503 672 265
SOURCE: Calculated from Biddle and Hamermesh (1990).
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sons, the marginal value of sleep for the average woman exceeds that 
for the average man. Of course, we fi nd the usual result that women’s 
market work time is more responsive to changing incentives than that 
of men; but the response is all along margins of household production 
and leisure, and hardly at all along the margin of sleep time. The main 
conclusion, however, is that even something which one might believe is 
not responsive to economic incentives—sleep—reacts just the way that 
economists might expect.
WHEN WE DO THINGS
A widely held notion is that people are now working around the 
clock in this country—a 24/7 economy. The virtue of time-diary data, 
such as those comprising the ATUS, is that one knows exactly what each 
Figure 1.2A  Timing of Work over the Day, Men, 1973 and 2003







Midnight 6 am Noon 6 pm 11 pm
Time of day (centered on hour)
Men in 1973 Men in 2003
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sample respondent is doing at each point in the day. One can, therefore, 
summarize the fractions of the population engaged in specifi c activities 
in each time interval—for our purposes, during each quarter-hour of the 
day. Included in the calculations here are all those people who work for 
pay on the diary day, with male and female workers in Figures 1.2A and 
1.2B respectively. The data for 1973 are based on the May 1973 CPS 
Multiple Jobholding Supplement (Hamermesh 1999), which included 
questions about starting and ending times of market work, while the 
2003 data are from the ATUS. In each fi gure the total amounts of work 
time have been adjusted to be equal, so that the fi gures isolate the effect 
of differences in the distribution of the timing of market work across 
the day.
Not surprisingly, most of the work for pay is performed in the mid-
dle of the day, with very few people working at 3 a.m. The interesting 
thing to note here is that, from midnight to 6 a.m., the line for 1973 lies 
above that for 2003 among both men and women. Thirty years ago we 
Figure 1.2B  Timing of Work over the Day, Women, 1973 and 2003







Midnight 6 am Noon 6 pm 11 pm
Time of day (centered on hour)
Women in 1973 Women in 2003
20   Hamermesh
were doing a greater fraction of our work late at night, and similarly for 
the late evening hours on the right-hand side of the fi gures. We were 
also working more during the middle of the day. The big change is not 
that we are working at night more than before; we are not. Rather, we 
are performing a much greater fraction of our work at fringe times—
early morning, 5–8 a.m., and early evening, 5–7 p.m. 
We make decisions about timing over the day, but we also make 
decisions about timing over the week, the year, and a lifetime. While 
major chunks of the literature in applied micro- and macroeconomics 
have dealt with the last of these temporal decisions (essentially looking 
at life-cycle choices about labor supply), very little has been published 
on the fi rst of these (but see Hamermesh [1996]). To demonstrate the 
potential importance of this issue, in Table 1.6 I present information on 
the hebdomadal distribution of market work by gender in the same four 
countries for which information was given in Tables 1.2 and 1.4. 
What stands out in this table, beyond the fact that I have already 
demonstrated how much market work Americans do, is how much 
work we perform on weekends compared to northern Europeans. In-
deed, even compared to Italian men we do a greater share of our total 
market and household work on weekends. Coupled with the fact that 
Americans have fewer days of vacation than do citizens of the wealthier 
Table 1.6  Time Allocations, All Men 20–74, Weekdays and Weekends 











Market work Weekdays 340 333 357 392
Weekends 67 57 124 112
All work Weekdays 512 471 467 538 
Weekends 245 217 251 318
Women
Market work Weekdays 173 161 165 257
Weekends 33 33 55 63
All work Weekdays 503 443 519 522
Weekends 299 265 383 351
SOURCE: Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2008).
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European nations, it is clear that we tend to spread our work temporally 
much more than in other rich economies.
One aspect of life-cycle behavior has been especially heavily stud-
ied, namely, retirement/labor-force withdrawal. To me the most in-
teresting aspect of the issue is why people retire—why they go from 
working full or nearly full time to no market work at all. The incentive 
effects of Social Security and pension benefi ts, both labor supply phe-
nomena, have been studied extensively. I want to concentrate instead 
on incentives resulting from what goes on inside the household—how 
older people spend time and the effect of working in the market on their 
allocation of nonmarket time. 
As an academic I am very lucky: At any time from my early six-
ties on I can partly retire—teach half-time or less during the academic 
year for a set number of years—but retain my job. I could teach full 
time one semester and have the other eight or more months to do other 
things, including travel and uninterrupted research. I would receive half 
my salary and keep my offi ce. There are very few other jobs where a 
worker can do this. The inability to retire partially in the same job is a 
problem, because there is an increasing number of highly skilled people 
who retire fully. At a time when most developed countries are facing 
or will face increasing skill shortages, partly caused by demography, 
this loss of older skilled workers seems increasingly serious. Given that 
older people are healthier at a given age than were earlier older cohorts, 
policies that inhibit partial retirement or, indeed, that fail to offset in-
centives for full retirement, implicitly lead to the early destruction of 
human resources. 
To begin, consider how the allocation of time changes over the life 
cycle. Table 1.7 presents averages by age of time allocations on a typical 
day for ATUS respondents in 2003 and 2004. Comparing the data for all 
respondents 55–59 to the same data for all people 65–69, whether they 
work for pay or not, we see that this decade is where the big drop-off in 
time spent in market work occurs: A drop from 256 minutes on a typical 
day down to 87 minutes. Where do these nearly three hours of time go 
each day? Family care and other household production rise a little bit, 
maybe 40 minutes a day, and sleeping and eating also rise by around 30 
minutes. The big change is in the consumption of leisure, with nearly 
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two-thirds of the time freed up from market work going into leisure—
and over half that amount going into additional television viewing. 
The question is: Would people possibly enjoy life more, and would 
society get more out of its highly skilled work force, if people could 
intersperse leisure and work in a more even pattern over their lives? 
There is substantial evidence (Gronau and Hamermesh forthcoming; 
Hamermesh 2005) that temporal variety rises with income at the daily 
and weekly levels, so why not at the level of the life cycle? One pos-
sibility is that there are fi xed costs of working just a little bit that cause 
disruptions to our scheduling of nonwork activities. For example, I 
need to wear a tie to teach, I need to wash up, I have to socialize with 
people whom I might not like, my mind is on work even when I am not 
working that day, etc. Working a little bit disrupts our lives and affects 
how and when we do our nonwork activities. Does a person who works 
a little bit behave differently from someone who does not work at all? 
Does labor force entry affect how people spend time away from work? 
Table 1.7  Time Use by Age, United States, 2003–2004 (minutes per 
representative day)
Age
 <55 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75+
Activity    
Market work 256 258 178 87 51 14
Other household 
production
146 187 198 221 225 204
Family care 67 40 49 46 38 32
Tertiary
Sleep 513 492 505 515 528 543
Personal care 46 50 49 48 46 49
Eating and      
drinking
68 79 84 88 94 93
Leisure
TV watching 142 165 189 218 230 250
Other 192 158 175 202 213 236
Other 10 11 13 15 15 19
SOURCE: Donald and Hamermesh (2007). 
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I take the 2003 and 2004 ATUS data and estimate how time spent in 
each of household production, tertiary activities, and leisure is affected 
by minutes of market work and whether one works, adjusted for a wide 
variety of demographic characteristics. Using those results, in Table 1.8 
I simulate how the typical American adult would spend her time if she 
did no market work, worked for pay just one minute, did the average 
amount of work, or worked full time. Of course, the average person, or 
the full-time worker, spends less time in leisure and less time in house-
hold production than nonworkers: There is an adding-up constraint of 
1,440 minutes per day. The crucial fi nding, however, is the difference 
between the nonworker and someone who works only a little bit for pay. 
The results show that labor market entry causes one to shift one’s non-
market activities around, consuming less leisure and engaging in more 
household production. Implicitly the fi xed cost of market work induces 
people to alter their nonmarket behavior.
In the last seven or eight years, people 65 and older have been 
working just a little bit longer. The reversal of the trend toward reduced 
labor force participation among older workers is not due to the stock 
market decline in the early part of this decade (Coile and Levine 2006), 
nor is it due to increases in the age of eligibility for full Social Security 
retirement benefi ts, because that happened more recently. Perhaps it is 
because people have begun to realize that they need to work more than 
40 years to support a retirement that could well last 30 years. Perhaps, 
however, companies and workers have begun to see the benefi ts of re-
structuring work so that older people can enjoy the benefi ts of variety 
and their employers can make continued use of their skills.
Table 1.8  Average Daily Minutes by Paid Work Status, Ages <60, United 







Nonworker  0 324 675 429
Just one minute of work  1 341 679 407
Average person 263 234 620 313
Full-time worker 343 203 602 280
SOURCE: Calculated from Donald and Hamermesh (2007). Eleven minutes per day 
could not be classifi ed.
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Timing does matter, but how we time our activities is subject to 
choice, and an interesting question is, What timing is desirable? One 
aspect of desirability is whose timing is the same as one’s own, and 
the most important person in many people’s lives is their spouse. I thus 
examine who gets to spend time with his or her spouse. This is an eco-
nomic decision: Although we want to spend time with our spouses (if 
not, presumably they would not be our spouses for long), spending time 
with them is costly. It constrains one’s fl exibility in earning income, so 
that synchronizing one’s schedule with one’s spouse’s time is costly. 
Assuming, as seems reasonable, that the fi xed costs of scheduling are 
independent of time prices, and assuming that spousal time is superior, 
we should fi nd that higher-income couples spend more time together. 
The spouses take jobs that might not be quite as good as possible in 
order to spend time together. They still earn a lot more than others, but 
not as much more as they otherwise would. In other words, one of the 
extra benefi ts the rich get out of life is more of the desirable good, time 
with one’s spouse.
Using the CPS May Multiple Jobholding Supplements, I examine 
for 1973 and 1978 combined, and for 1991 and 1997 combined, the 
timing of work among couples with two working spouses. In each case 
I have controlled for the total hours that each works for pay, so that the 
calculations abstract from differences in the amount of labor supplied 
to the market. If each spouse, for example, works 8 hours per day for 
pay, it is possible that they could have 16 hours to spend together. Or, 
however, their schedules could be completely disjointed so that they 
only have potentially 8 hours to spend together. The calculations are 
presented in Table 1.9. Going from a couple with each spouse in the 
tenth percentile of earnings to one with each spouse in the ninetieth per-
centile shows a small but clear increase in the amount of overlap in their 
Table 1.9  Joint Leisure among Full-Time Working Couples, 1970s and 
1990s (hours per day)
Hourly wage is: 1970s 1990s
10th Percentile 13.0 12.3
Average 13.2 12.5
90th Percentile 13.4 12.8
SOURCE: Calculated from Hamermesh (2002).
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work schedules. Couples in the upper part of the earnings distribution 
have roughly an extra half hour a day potentially to be together. While 
this is not a huge amount, it is about 5 percent of the average amount of 
time not accounted for by market work. This fi nding suggests that, if we 
measure well-being based solely on incomes, we understate inequality, 
since higher-income households have foregone some earnings in order 
to obtain schedules that allow potentially for more joint leisure. 
Couples do schedule themselves very much together; they tend to 
work in a nonrandom way at the same time and be off at the same time. 
Hamermesh (1996) shows this to be the case both in the United States 
and in Germany. Indeed, there is only one demographic group in which 
the spouses’ schedules appear to be completely independent. Not sur-
prisingly, that is couples with young children: If both work for pay, one 
is likely to be at home taking care of the children while the other is at 
work. Most couples, however, tend to schedule much of their work time 
simultaneously, more so than one would expect if this process were 
random. 
HOW WE FEEL ABOUT TIME—AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
Most of us feel that we do not have enough time. Given the limita-
tions discussed in this chapter’s introduction, this is not surprising. As 
economists, we can use the simple insights discussed there to study 
feelings about being pressed for time and use that study to weigh the 
importance of such complaints. Time is relatively scarce for higher-
income people—partly because their time is more valuable due to mar-
ket alternatives, partly because they have more income to spend in the 
same amount of time as the poor, and goods and time are not perfectly 
substitutable in generating outcomes that increase our happiness. If this 
is true, we should fi nd the rich complaining more about being rushed 
for time. 
I proposed this idea to a large U.S. foundation whose staff were 
mostly psychologists and sociologists. The staffers felt that this idea 
was typical economists’ nonsense, responding, “Can’t the rich simply 
have lots of time by paying people to do all the work for them at home 
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that they otherwise would have to do?” In other words, as a wealthier 
person, I can have somebody clean my house, maintain my garden, in-
stall halogen light bulbs, etc., and thus generate lots of time for myself. 
The answer is a resounding no, because the number of things that I can 
outsource is really very small. I cannot outsource my sleeping. Nobody 
can eat for me, attend a symphony for me, or watch the Super Bowl 
for me. Given this diffi culty in substituting goods for time, we should 
expect more whining about feeling rushed by members of wealthier 
households.
 In each of four countries’ large national surveys, respondents were 
asked how often they feel pressured for time. In Australia, Germany, 
and the United States, fi ve answers were possible: 1) always, 2) almost 
always, 3) sometimes, 4) almost never, or 5) never. In Korea only four 
responses were possible. The distributions of the responses in the four 
surveys are shown in Table 1.10. Clearly, in each country a large frac-
tion of adults view themselves as rushed much of the time; and very few 
feel themselves under time pressure only infrequently.
Is the theory of time and goods as joint inputs into utility consistent 
with what we observe about the impact of income differences on peo-
ple’s feelings about being pressured for time? Consider Figures 1.3A 
and 1.3B, which present information for men and women, respectively, 
for the four countries. Each bar presents average household earnings 
for a particular response to the time-stress question, moving from left 
to right for each sample from the second most time-stressed group to 
the least time-stressed group. For comparison purposes earnings are set 
equal to 100 in each sample for those who say they are always stressed 
for time—the most time-stressed group—and they are not included in 
Table 1.10  Percent Distributions of Time Pressure, Couples—Australia 
2001, Germany 2002, United States 2003, and Korea 1999
Under time 
pressure:
Australia Germany United States Korea
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Always, almost 
always
43.4 50.5 34.3 36.4 42.6 54.5 70.7 68.5
Sometimes 41.9 39.3 38.2 41.7 33.5 29.8
Rarely, almost 
never, never
14.7 10.2 27.5 21.9 23.9 15.7 29.3 31.5
SOURCE: Hamermesh and Lee (2007).
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the graph. Numbers below 100 indicate that a group’s earnings are less 
that of the most time-stressed group. 
In most cases, as one moves rightward from the darker bar to the 
successively lighter bars in Figures 1.3A and 1.3B, average household 
earnings decrease. Those who express less time stress are those who are 
earning less. The same result holds when we adjust for how much time 
people work for pay—the phenomenon arises from differences in time 
prices, not only from differences in total income. When people complain 
about how rushed and stressed their life is, they are really complaining 
that they have lots of money. If they are upset, they could choose to 
work less and earn less; that they do not choose to work less suggests 
that, despite the complaints, their utility is higher in the more stressed 
situation. Indeed, and not surprisingly in light of the theory, those who 
express more stress for time also are more likely to be satisfi ed with 
their income. The poor complain about lack of income, because income 
is relatively scarce for them, and the rich complain about lack of time, 
because time is relatively scarce for them. I am more sympathetic to the 
former set of complaints, but others may have different values.
Table 1.10 also documents a difference in feelings of time pressure 
by gender: In all countries except Korea, women are signifi cantly more 
likely to feel that they are rushed for time. (Korea is different from the 
others because women are much less likely than men to engage in mar-
ket work, a major source of time pressure.) 
Why do women feel more rushed for time? It is not due to the pres-
ence of children at home, as the same gender difference exists when one 
adjusts for the presence of children and even for the time spent in caring 
for them. One possible explanation is that there are costs of switching 
among activities—fi xed costs of changing what we do—that lead to 
feelings of being rushed. In six countries, Australia, Germany, Israel, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States, Gronau and Hamer-
mesh (forthcoming) examine the number of different activities engaged 
in on an average day by married men and married women. In each case 
wives did more different things than their husbands, which could lead 
to feelings of being rushed. Another possible explanation is that, be-
yond the additional uses of time in which women engage, they are also 
managers of the household—they are on call for problems. Yet another, 
related possibility is that these diffi culties combine with fi xed costs and 
rigid scheduling to impose tighter constraints on women’s use of time.
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Figure 1.3A  Household Earnings by Time Stress (earnings = 100 if
always stressed)
Men
Figure 1.3B  Household Earnings by Time Stress (earnings = 100 if
always stressed)
Women
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CONCLUSION
The creation of the ATUS as a continuing survey is the single most 
important data initiative in the labor area to occur in the 40 years since 
I completed my doctoral degree. Over time it will provide enough in-
formation on small demographic groups to allow analyses of the non-
market behavior of nearly any group in which researchers are inter-
ested. It will enable us to chart how time use varies over the life cycle 
and the business cycle. One caveat is in order, however: Other social 
scientists are as capable as economists at summarizing allocations of 
time and making simple comparisons. Our comparative advantage lies 
in going beyond this to creating interesting theory-based hypotheses 
that can only be tested with the kind of data on nonmarket time that the 
ATUS generates. The ATUS should be a boon for economic research, 
but it also challenges us to think like economists rather than to mimic 
sociologists.
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